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Introduction
This paper explores Quine’s solution to the problem of negative
existentials. First, Russell’s theory of descriptions shall be
explained as an original solution to this problem. Next, it will
be explained how Quine utilizes Russell’s theory and expands
it to apply to all singular terms within a language. Finally, it
shall be demonstrated that Quine’s solution is not a descriptive
solution, but a normative solution. As such, to argue against
the plausibility of his solution involves disputing his normative
methodological considerations. The paper shall conclude by
explaining the pros and cons of a modified Quinean solution
against the solution he objects to in “On What There Is”.
The Problem of Negative Existentials
To understand the problem of negative existentials, one must
understand the principles that govern the theories of meaning
employed by philosophers like Frege, Russell, and Quine.
The problem arises due to an inherent tension among these
principles. The first principle is that of compositionality:
[ComP] If two expressions have the same reference, then
substitution of one for the other in a third expression
does not change its reference1.

In [ComP], ‘expressions’ refers to both individual
syntactic units like words, as well as complete
expressions like sentences. Thus, the substitution of
a word x in a sentence S with an equivalent reference
results in no change to the meaning of neither the word
nor the sentence. This relies on a further assumption
surrounding the foundation of meaning:
[ToM] Meaning consists wholly in the reference of
expressions.

If [ToM] is true, then one can derive two further principles:
1 Zoltán Gendler Szabó, Problems of Compositionality (Routledge, 2013), 7.
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[ToM-W] The meaning of a word consists in its
ontological correlate.

[ToM-S] The meaning of a sentence consists in its truthvalue2.

From these principles one can derive an absurd conclusion.
Consider a sentence of the following form: ‘There does not exist
an object x.’ If, as [ComP] states, the meaning of a sentence is
determined by the references of its constituent parts, then the
referent of ‘x’ will provide meaning to the sentence in which
it is contained, thus providing the truth-value to the sentence.
If no constituents in the sentence have a reference, then the
sentence cannot have meaning and (by [ToM-S]) cannot have a
truth-value. This is prima facie incorrect: a rational agent would
not believe that a sentence of this form has no truth-value, let
alone has no meaning.
The problem then becomes how one avoids this undesirable
absurdity while retaining the principles one deems as
intuitively correct for all other cases.
Russell’s Solution: The Theory of Descriptions
Russell draws attention to a distinction between grammatical
form and logical form. He argues that although it may be the
case that a certain expression in a sentence serves as the subject
(or singular term) grammatically, it need not be the case that it
serves as the subject (or singular term) logically. Russell gives
an example of the sentence, ‘All men [humans] are mortal’.
Grammatically, ‘all men’ serves as the subject of this sentence;
however, to determine the truth-value of this sentence, one
must derive its logical form. Thus, he argues the correct logical
form is: ‘If x is human, then x is mortal’3. Therefore, the subject
is no longer ‘all men’, but is instead the variable x whose
domain ranges over all possible objects in the world.
Drawing attention to the distinction between grammatical and
logical form, Russell argues that one can dissolve the problem
of negative existentials. In such sentences, though an expression
may serve grammatically as subject, it does not do so in its
logical form. The sentence, ‘There does not exist an object x’, has
2 Te justifcation of this assumption is outside the scope of this paper; however, for justifcations,
see: Gottlob Frege, “On Concept and Object,” in B. McGuinness ed., Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 193.
3 Bertrand Russell, “On Denoting,” Mind 14, no. 56 (1905): 480.
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a logical form that does not treat the object under consideration
as the singular term. Suppose the object under consideration is
‘Pegasus’. The logical form of the sentence, ‘There does not exist
a Pegasus’, would have the following logical form4, 5:
~(3x)[(Pegasus(x) A ('vy)(Pegasus(y)

⇒

x

= y)]'

Thus, as in the universal quantifier example above, the subject
of this sentence is the variable x that ranges over all objects
in the domain under consideration (the external world for
Russell).
Understanding negative existentials as having this logical form
entails that the truth of such a sentence is no longer dependent
on the reference of some singular-term ‘Pegasus’, but rather,
upon the existence of some object x that is contained under
the concept of ‘Pegasus’. Therefore, one can hold the stated
principles without deriving the problem of negative existentials.
Quine’s Adoption
The analysis posed in the introduction of “How does Quine
solve the problem of negative existentials” is, strictly speaking,
a nonsensical question. Unlike Russell, Quine seems to reject
[ComP]: “[…] truth values seem to attach to singular statement
only conditionally upon existence of the named object…
there would seem, under ordinary usage, to be no way of
adjudicating the truth values of ‘Pegasus flies’ and ‘~Pegasus
flies’; the nonexistence of Pegasus seems to dispose of the
question without answering it.”6 This position is the same
as Gottlob Frege’s7. Despite (as shall be shown) adopting
the Theory of Descriptions and, in a sense, providing a
‘solution’ to the problem of negative existentials, this is simply
an unintended by-product of a larger intent: to advance a
normative program of eliminating singular terms from one’s
language8. This normative component will be crucial in the
4 Sentences of this form are called ‘defnitive descriptions’.
5 It should be noted that, strictly speaking, the usage of ‘exist’ as a predicate is not possible for
Russell’s system of philosophy. He proposes the principle of acquaintance to avoid the issues that
come with admitting a concept like ‘existence’. For simplicity’s sake, and because it has no impact
on the thesis of this paper, I ignore this issue.
6 Lenny Clapp, Marga Reimer, and Anne Spire, “Negative Existentials,” in Jeanette Gundel and
Barbara Abbott ed. Te Oxford Handbook of Reference (Oxford University Press, 2019): 13; W.
V. Quine, “Meaning and Inference” in From a Logical Point of View: Logico-Philosophical Essays
(Harper & Row, 1963), 165.
7 Michael Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language (Harper & Row, 1973), 185.
8 Te normative component of Quine, especially his naturalized is epistemology, is acknowledged
by himself: W. V. Quine, Pursuit of Truth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 1920; Lenny Clapp, Marga Reimer, and Anne Spire, “Negative Existentials,” in Jeanette Gundel and

56

EPISTEME XXXIII

objection posed to Quine’s ‘solution’ at the end of this paper.
Having acknowledged the nature of Quine’s motivations, one
can now see that his solution is indirect at best, but that it can
be loosely considered a solution with qualifications. A brief
historical exposition will serve to provide a clearer picture of
Quine’s motivations in the elimination of singular terms.
Quine Against Meinong or Wyman
In “On What There Is,” Quine engages with an imagined
interlocutor by the name of “Wyman.” This interlocutor is
meant to represent the thoughts of Meinong, who famously
drew a distinction between existing and real objects. Meinong
held that, though something may not be ‘real’, it can still
be present within one’s conceptual scheme by ‘existing’9.
Thus, though no real object is a ‘gold mountain’, an object
falling under the concepts ‘goldenness’ and ‘mountainhood’
still ‘exists’. According to Meinong, to reject this is to be
“prejudice[d] in favor of the actual.10” Meinong’s motivation
in proposing his “jungle” is to provide an ontology that meets
the natural intuition that every thought has a corresponding
object associated with it11. This also provides a solution to the
problem of negative existentials: the ‘unreal objects’ may not be
‘real’, but they are still able to be referents of sentences in virtue
of their existence in one’s ontology.
Quine proposes multiple arguments against this perspective;
however, most are ultimately unsuccessful because they beg
the question against Meinong. For example, Quine argues that
Meinong’s jungle entails that there must exist contradictory
objects. If every conceivable combination of properties has a
corresponding entity (existing or not), then there are naturally
logically-contradictory objects: “Can we drive Wyman now to
Barbara Abbott ed. Te Oxford Handbook of Reference (Oxford University Press, 2019): 13-4.
9 Tere are, of course, multiple ways to formulate this view. Tis formulation difers from Quine’s
in “On What Matters”; however, I believe this formulation is simpler for the paper and it in no
way changes Quine’s motivations or arguments against the Meinongian view.
10 Terence Parsons, Nonexistent Objects (Yale University Press, 1980), 18; A. Meinong, “Te
Teory of Objects,” in R. Chisholm ed. Realism and the Background of Phenomenology (New
York: Free Press, 1960).
11 Tough outside the scope of this paper, it is worth noting that this follows from Meinong’s
adoption of Brentano and Husserl’s notion of intentionality: the thoughts in a rational agent’s
mind have a certain relationship with the external world wherein all thoughts are targeted towards an object. To make sense of this intentionality, there must be some object thought about.

57

Was Meinong Right About Negative Existentials?

admitting a realm of unactualized possibilities?12” This might
strike Quine as absurd prima facie; however, Meinong has no
qualms with such a result:
Naturally I cannot in any way evade this consequence:
whoever once has dealings with a round square will
not be able to stop when faced with a square or some
other sort of object which is simultaneously round and
not round. But one will also, as far as I can see, have
weighty reasons hereupon to take the initiative: the
principle of contradiction is to be applied by no one to
anything other than to reality and possibility13, 14.

Thus, Quine’s objections to Meinong cannot be posed without
begging the question against Meinong; the conclusions deemed
absurd by Quine are not deemed absurd by Meinong and
followers, and Quine gives no reason why such a position is
absurd.
Similarly, Quine argues that Wyman’s usage of ‘exist’ is unfair:
it merely pushes the problem of negative existentials back a
step. Yet, having clearly recognized the distinction between
‘exist’ and ‘real’, one can recognize that this does actually solve
the problem as properly constructed. Meinong’s proposal
would only be inadequate if he argued that existing, unreal
entities were not capable of functioning as referents to singular
terms as stipulated by [ComP]. Yet, as stated, this is not an
absurdity for Meinong: the entire motivation of such a broad,
rich ontology is to provide such unreal entities the ability to
function as the ontological correlates of such singular terms.
As such, these objections against Wyman (Meinong) are ruled
question-begging. The primary question then becomes: why
prefer Quine’s solution to Meinong’s?
Quine’s Solution
Quine adopts Russell’s Theory of Descriptions and broadens
its scope. Rather than treating only non-referring singular
terms as functioning as definite descriptions, he argues that all
singular terms within a language function this way. His reasons
12 W. V. Quine, “On What Tere Is” in From a Logical Point of View: Logico-Philosophical
Essays (Harper & Row, 1963), 4.
13 Terence Parsons, Nonexistent Objects (Yale University Press, 1980), 31.
14 I take for granted this reading is correct. Tere do exist other interpretations of Meinong that
do not entail this conclusion. See: ibid.
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for doing so rest on methodological principles like economy
and Ockham’s razor. He wishes to reduce the cardinality of
the set of all existing objects in one’s ontology15. By treating all
singular terms as definitive descriptions, one no longer needs
to hold that all such terms have a unique ontological correlation
that exists in the world. This would greatly reduce the number
of entities contained within an ontological framework.
Quine’s Solution vs. Meinong’s Solution
Having established that Quine’s objections are inadequate
against Meinong’s presuppositions, one must inquire as to the
undesirability of these presuppositions. At the heart of Quine’s
philosophy is a vehement adherence to Ockham’s razor: to
minimize both the number of kinds of entities, as well as the
number of individual entities within a given kind16. Assuming
Ockham’s razor is a desirable methodological principle, one
can press Meinong on the fact that it violates this principle. Yet,
one must also recognize some glaring flaws with Quine’s own
solution.
First, Quine’s solution does not seem to provide a clear method
of revealing the logical form of sentences that contain indexicals
(‘I’, ‘this’, ‘my’, ‘there’, etc.). Thus, how does one reveal the
logical form of ‘This cup is red’? Quine’s speculative solution
is radically inadequate: it rests on translating ‘this’ into ‘there’,
which is still an indexical preposition17. It is outside the scope
of this paper to consider if there is some other way to correct
this deficiency, but it is certain that Quine never provided any
solution of his own.
Secondly, it is unclear how one is to translate a singular term
into a definite description. For example, take the proper
name ‘Aristotle’. What definite description would correspond
to this proper name? One possible answer would be ‘The
student of Plato’. However, this is still quite ambiguous:
there have been multiple students of Plato. Perhaps instead
one gives the description ‘Writer of Nichomachean Ethics’.
If meaning is inherently tied to understanding the references
of expressions, as Quine thinks it is, can someone mean the
15 W. V. Quine, “On Simple Teories of a Complex World,” in Te Ways of Paradox and Other
Essays (Random House, 1966), 242.
16 Ibid.
17 W. V. Quine, Word and Object (Te M.I.T. Press, 1960), 163; Lenny Clapp, Marga Reimer,
and Anne Spire, “Negative Existentials,” in Jeanette Gundel and Barbara Abbott ed. Te Oxford
Handbook of Reference (Oxford University Press, 2019): 12-3.
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referent of ‘Aristotle’ even if they are not aware of one of the
unique definite descriptions of him and instead know only the
ambiguous description ‘The student of Plato’18?
The strongest objection to Quine, as noted by Clapp, Reimer,
and Spire, is that the interpretation of singular terms all being
definite descriptions is explanatorily inadequate19. When one
asserts ‘The sun is hot’, it is unintuitive to suggest that one is
actually asserting ‘There exists an arbitrary object such that it
is a sun, and any other arbitrary object that is a sun is the first
arbitrary object, and it is hot’. Russell’s solution seems to work
in part because it is explanatorily adequate: it is not unintuitive
to suggest unreal entities are spoken of in this manner. To
extend this translation to all singular objects seems absurd.
Yet, crucially, Quine would agree; descriptively, his theory is
bunk. However, this is of no concern because Quine’s project
here is prescriptive and normative and not descriptive:
Quine is not interested in why we judge some occurrences of
negative existentials to be true; rather, Quine is proposing a
revision of natural language which will enable us to discuss the
ontological question of what there is without having to face the
problem of negative existentials20.
This is why it was stated that Quine’s solution is not really a
solution at all in the original sense of the question. It is not a
descriptive solution; however, it is a solution that could work
if a group of language users adopted it as a true reflection of
human thought while providing utterances containing singular
terms.
With this crucial qualification in mind, I suggest we create a
new position that encompasses Russell’s solution in the form of
the Theory of Descriptions, with the normative principles Quine
utilizes (question-beggingly) in his objections to Meinong. Thus,
we abandon Quine’s conception of eliminating singular terms
altogether and restrict ourselves to merely unreal objects; yet,
we make as our primary motivation Ockham’s razor as Quine
does (and arguably as Russell does too). We shall call this
18 Problems like these have motivated many philosophers to abandon a descriptive theory
of proper names and to adopt Kripke’s causal theory. It is of course possible to provide many
amendments to answer the objection posed; however, the thrust is clear. Any response requires
weakening Quine’s original thesis.
19 Ibid., 13.
20 Ibid., 14.
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worldview Quine₂.
It should be noted that there can be no resolution in this paper;
a methodological dispute takes far greater than eight pages, and
there can be no clear decider between Meinong’s and Quine₂’s
solutions. In conclusion, all that can be provided is a summary
of what each view entails. It is up to the individual philosopher
to determine which normative considerations are considered
more valuable.
Meinong’s solution works: no contradictions arise on the
presuppositions that are adopted. Such presuppositions,
however, may be seen as undesirable by other philosophers.
These include: an extremely expanded, though powerful,
ontology; a commitment to the existence of logically
contradictory entities; and, arguably, a departure from commonsense thought on the usage of ‘existence’.
Quine₂’s solution arguably does not work: there are multiple
objections that must be resolved before one can definitely say
that it does. These include the problems of indexicals (as used
in negative existentials), and the problem of ambiguity (as
applied to negative existentials), among others not covered in
this paper. Its largest benefit is an extremely economical and
reduced ontology.
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